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Introduction  
Contemporary democracies differ considerably in the issue composition of their protest politics. 
In countries like Germany and the Czech Republic, the vast majority of protests have been 
mobilised around socio-cultural issues, such as human rights, peace or the environment, and only 
a tiny portion of protest has focused on economic issues (Císař 2013; Hutter 2014, 142; Kriesi et 
al. 1995, 20, 22; Rucht 1998, 40), whereas protest in France or Poland usually has a strong 
economic character and voices demands for material redistribution and social policy (Ekiert and 
Kubik 2001, 130; Fillieule 1997; Hutter 2014, 142; Kriesi et al. 1995, 20, 22). What lies behind 
the cross-country differences in national protest agendas?  
We argue that, in addition to other factors (e.g. social structure, historical legacies, and 
external events) that determine which specific issues are contested in a given society, the types of 
issues that are salient in the national protest agenda depend on what issues the mainstream political 
parties are competing on – or in other words, on the content and strength of the master-issue 
dimension. Drawing on research into niche political parties, we expect that there is a substitutive 
effect; where the stronger a specific master-issue dimension (either economic or socio-cultural) is 
in party politics, the less salient that issue dimension is in protest politics. This substitutive effect 
results from the tendency of party politics to reduce political conflict to single-dimension 
equilibrium, which decreases the importance of other issue dimensions and relegates the contest 
over secondary, niche issues to the realm of policy-seeking strategies, with protest being a common 
type of this political strategy. In party systems where single-dimension equilibrium does not exist 
and the master-issue dimension is weaker, the same dynamics result in a more convergent 
relationship between party and protest politics and a greater similarity between the protest- and 
party-system agendas.    
 To investigate this theory, we examine the national protest agendas in four countries – the 




factors that are not that readily available in the old Western democracies. The content and the 
strength of the master-issue dimension vary in these cases. We draw on an original dataset of 
protest events organised in the four countries between 1993 and 2010 and on qualitative and 
quantitative data on the issue dimensions of party politics, which we obtained from studies on 
party politics and expert surveys. The results show that in the Czech Republic, where the master-
issue dimension has remained steadily and strongly economic, protest has been predominantly 
socio-cultural. In Poland between 1993 and 2001 and Hungary between 1993 and 2006, the master-
issue dimensions are strongly socio-cultural, while protest is predominantly economic. There is no 
single-dimension equilibrium in party politics in Slovakia or in post-2001 Poland and mainstream 
parties compete on both economic and socio-cultural issues. Consequently, the substitutive 
dynamics between party and protest politics is weaker and the issue agendas in party and protest 
arenas are here more alike.  
 
The national protest agenda and party politics   
Do countries systematically differ in the types of issues that are articulated by their protest politics? 
Cross-country variations in the composition of national protest agendas have not been studied 
much. Social movement research has mostly examined variation in the volume and the repertoire 
of protest, disregarding the variation in issues (Della Porta and Diani 2015, pt. V). Studies on 
protest issues usually focus on a few single-issue movement families, such as radical right 
movements or global justice protest, and examine the issue positions, claims and framing strategies 
of selected movement actors (Benford and Snow 2000; Fillieule and Accornero 2016). Similarly, 
most research on protest in Eastern Europe has analysed only specific movements in single 
countries (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013). Because of their focus on individual social 
movements, those studies have been unable to analyse the aggregate picture of the issues that are 
salient in protest politics.  
The national protest agenda is a system-level feature that captures issues articulated by 
protest in a given country and period. It is an aggregate of all protests organised at a certain place 
and time and indicates which issues receive the most attention in a given national protest arena. 
The concept of issue agendas has been pursued most by party system research on cleavages and 
the political space (Benoit and Laver 2006; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Lipset and 




political conflict including protest (Hutter 2014, chaps. 6, 7; Kriesi et al. 2012). The national 
protest agenda has been analysed in several Western democracies (Fillieule 1997; Hutter 2014, 
chaps. 6, 7; Kriesi et al. 1995, 20, 22; Rucht 1998, 40). In Eastern Europe, the issue makeup of 
protest politics has been mapped for the transition and pre-transition periods in the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia (Beissinger 2002, della Porta 2014) and for the first years of transition in Poland 
(Ekiert and Kubik 2001). Comparative studies on the post-transformation period are not available. 
Studies so far have either focused only on one country (e.g. Robertson 2010) or covered a short 
period of time and pooled data on all countries together (e.g. Beissinger and Sasse 2014). 
Developing this stream of research further, this study examines the national protest agenda in four 
East-Central European countries in the period from 1993 to 2010.  
What determines the types of issues expressed in national protest agendas? One factor is 
the broader political system that determines the political opportunities for and constraints on 
mobilization, with party politics being the system’s important component (Tilly 1978; Kriesi et al. 
1995; McAdam and Tarrow 2013; Meyer 2004). To explain the nature of the substantive demands 
that movements make, scholars use discursive or policy-specific opportunities and analyse the 
mobilisation of parties on the same issues (Giugni et al. 2005; Hutter 2014; Koopmans et al. 2005; 
Koopmans and Statham 1999; Kriesi et al. 1995; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Soule et al. 1999; van 
Dyke 2003). This literature, however, mostly focuses on the actor level (parties and movements) 
and does not capture the aggregate relationship between the country’s national protest agenda and 
the issues contested in party politics.   
This article combines the concepts of issue dimensionality and issue salience developed in 
the policy space and niche party literature to explain how the character of the national protest 
agenda is tied to the issues contested in party politics (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2010; Farrer 
2014; Meguid 2005; Miller and Schofield 2003; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009; Rovny and 
Edwards 2012). First, we distinguish between the economic and the socio-cultural issue 
dimensions that structure specific political issues and constitute the main axis of political conflict. 
Then we explain the conditions of the eliminatory effect of the master-issue dimension in party 
politics on the protest agenda. Further, we discuss how this effect varies according to the strength 
of the master-issue dimension, i.e. depending on whether the master dimension is the only 
dimension that mainstream parties compete on or whether they compete on multiple issue 




includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia and covers the period between 1993 
and 2010.  
 
The dimensionality of the political contest 
In order to compare the different political issues in party and protest politics across countries and 
over time, we distinguish two issue dimensions that constitute the main axes of political conflict – 
the economic and socio-cultural dimensions. Specific issues, such as the reform of a pension 
system or the voting rights of Hungarians living abroad, are too idiosyncratic to allow systematic 
comparisons across various contexts. Moreover, empirical analyses of party politics and of public 
opinion show that positions on various specific issues correlate with each other in a way that they 
cluster around the two dimensions1 (Benoit and Laver 2012; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; 
Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema 2012; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Kriesi et al. 2008; Marks 
et al. 2006; Rovny and Edwards 2012). Similarly, protest activism tends to differ along the two 
issue dimensions, with ‘old social movements’ voicing primarily economic grievances and ‘new 
social movements’ mostly expressing cultural issues (Fraser and Honneth 2003; Hutter 2014, chap. 
7; Kerbo 1982).  
The economic dimension encompasses issues of economic redistribution, government 
regulation of the economy, taxation, welfare etc. It reflects the socialist-capitalist class conflict 
that exists in every society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 1994) and captures the political 
division between left-wing and right-wing economic demands. The socio-cultural dimension 
embraces a variety of non-economic issues that primarily relate to culture and identity. This issue 
dimension summarises the conflictual line between cultural liberalism and conservative socio-
cultural positions. It includes issues connected to religion, traditional values and morality, 
lifestyles and sexuality, the role of authority, nationalism, community, or the environment (Marks 
et al. 2006) and captures political disputes waged from secular-religious, centre-periphery, urban-
rural (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), libertarian-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994), and postmaterialist-
traditionalist positions (Inglehart 1977).   
                                                          
1 To be sure, economic and socio-cultural dimensions are in some contexts strongly correlated with each 
other. Also, some specific socio-cultural issues might in some countries stand out as an independent third 
dimension. The main finding, however, is that most socio-cultural issues show a high level of inter-
correlation among parties, candidates and the public and thus can be subsumed under one abstract 





The master-issue dimension  
As noted already by Downs (1957), party politics tends to converge the political contest into 
centripetal single-dimension equilibrium (whether economic or socio-cultural). In order to 
maximise voter support and form a majority government, mainstream political parties in two-party 
systems and coalitions in multiparty systems have to find one unifying position under which they 
can align various other, often conflicting, issues. Coalition governments and mainstream parties 
are thus ‘coalitions of enemies’ (Miller and Schofield 2003, 249). Their alliance is only possible 
thanks to the reduction of political conflict to a single dimension that demarks the issues that the 
government can come together around and leaves aside other issues that challenge its unity. 
Mainstream parties strive to maintain this advantageous ‘dimensional status quo’ by ‘freezing’ 
party competition along one master dimension and thus try to eliminate competing secondary 
issues (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 60). Empirical research has provided supportive evidence of 
this. Mainstream parties tend to emphasise the salience of their master issue dimension; they 
employ various strategies to silence potentially disruptive secondary issues; they are generally 
reluctant to change their policy focus; and they try to respond to the median voter (Adams et al. 
2006; Ezrow 2010; Meguid 2005; Meyer and Wagner 2013; Rovny and Edwards 2012).  
Literature on niche parties explains how the tendency of party systems to converge the 
competition along a single master dimension affects competition on the secondary issues that do 
not fall under the master dimension. Niche political parties, such as the radical right parties or 
Greens that are present in the parliaments of several Western democracies, are parties that compete 
on issues and positions that mainstream parties do not emphasise. These are, predominantly, 
secondary issues that are neglected by mainstream parties (Wagner 2012; Meguid 2005); 
according to some authors, parties that occupy non-centrist extreme positions on the master 
dimension also belong in this category (Adams et al. 2006). Importantly, unlike mainstream 
parties, which are office-seeking, oriented towards the median voter and seek to maintain the 
single-dimension status quo, niche parties are mainly driven by their policy – they emphasise the 
salience of their issues, which are neglected by mainstream parties, and respond to the opinions of 
their issue-defined electorate (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Farrer 2014; Meguid 2005; Meyer 
and Wagner 2013; Rovny and Edwards 2012). By increasing the salience of secondary issues, 




operate as a destabilising force that tries to ‘tear the system apart’ (Rovny and Edwards 2012, 56, 
61; Sartori 1976, 350).  
The result for the whole political system is that the political contest is driven by a 
competition to determine the content of the master dimension, with mainstream parties and 
candidates seeking to maintain the current single-dimension equilibrium, which is being 
challenged by actors that are asserting other, secondary issues (Rovny and Edwards 2012; Adams 
et al. 2006; Meguid 2005; Miller and Schofield 2003). Importantly, the continuous conflict over 
the salience of different issue dimensions has the aggregate effect of establishing a ‘dynamic 
stability’ in the dimensional structure of issues (Miller and Schofield 2003, 245). The tendency of 
party competition to converge in single-dimension equilibrium and the stability of the resulting 
constellation are relatively strong. The issue dimensionality of party politics does not fluctuate 
much over time. Indeed, most contemporary democracies show a relatively stable dimensional 
structure in party politics over time, with mainstream parties competing on the master issue 
dimension, which is usually economic, and niche parties challenging the master dimension on 
secondary issues (Benoit and Laver 2012; Miller and Schofield 2003; Rovny and Edwards 2012). 
We extend this theory to protest. As Farrer (2014; also Ezrow 2010) notes, niche political 
parties and advocacy groups are, in fact, fundamentally similar types of political actors, as both 
try to pursue neglected policy issues and both are thus very different from mainstream parties. Like 
niche parties, non-partisan advocacy actors and protest in general have traditionally acted as a 
‘rival to the political representation system’ (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 5) and have sought 
to challenge the existing party system, introducing new and neglected issues (Goldstone 2003; 
McAdam and Tarrow 2013; Tilly 1978). Niche parties and protest are thus outcomes of the same 
process, which is the tendency of party systems to gravitate towards a single-dimension 
competition between mainstream parties. Moreover, the division of issue dimensions between 
mainstream parties competing around the master dimension in the party arena and the secondary 
issue dimension that protest focuses on should be even sharper than in the case of mainstream and 
niche political parties. Unlike niche parties that still need to compete for votes and thus cannot 
completely ignore the master issue dimension (Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005; Ezrow 2010), 
social movements and protest can focus solely on neglected issues because they are not trying to 
get into office. Because of that, we generally expect that in the long run there will emerge in 




protest agenda and the content of the master issue dimension contested in party politics. If the 
master issue dimension in party politics is economic, protest will predominantly focus on socio-
cultural issues and vice versa.  
 
The strength of the master dimension   
The intensity of the substitutive effect in the issue dimensions contested in party and protest arenas 
depends on how strong the single-dimension tendency in the party system is. In situations where 
single-dimension equilibrium does not exist, the issues contested in party and protest politics will 
be more alike. This disequilibrium may be short term in nature, as is observed in the aftermath of 
an extremely powerful exogenous shock (economic crisis, regime breakdown like that in the time 
of the democratic transition, the collapse of one of the mainstream parties following a corruption 
scandal, as was the case in Hungary in 2006, see below). It may also be more gradual, as described 
in the literature on party re-alignment, when party and social movement activists try to increase 
the salience of the secondary issue dimension and mainstream parties start to appeal to potential 
new voters who are left out of the current single-dimension structuring of party politics (Miller 
and Schofield 2003; McAdam and Tarrow 2013).  
A weak single-dimension tendency or even disequilibrium can also be more permanent in 
nature. In some countries, it is generally harder to achieve single-dimension equilibrium and build 
coalition governments because mainstream parties need to compete on more than one issue 
dimension at the same time in order to maximise votes and create coalitions (Rovny and Edwards 
2012, 60; Meguid 2005). This means that mainstream parties cannot wholly and solely exploit the 
master dimension while doing away with secondary issues, either by subsuming them within the 
master dimension or by dismissing them, as in the case of single-dimension equilibrium (Meguid 
2005). Rather, they need to balance their contestation between two independent dimensions of 
similar importance, but this reduces their ability to form a united coalition and divides their support 
base. By emphasising the secondary issue dimension, they undermine the primary role of the 
master dimension and vice versa. The consequence of this for the political conflict in these types 
of political systems is that the eliminatory effect the master dimension has on competition over the 
secondary issue dimension, which takes place when single-dimension equilibrium is strong, is 
weaker here. The distinction between mainstream parties and actors competing on the secondary 




converge. The substitutive relationship between the issues contested in the party and protest arenas 
is weaker. As a result of this we should see greater long-term similarity between the party and 
protest agendas in systems with a weaker master dimension.  
Importantly, there is no direct connection between a weak master dimension and multi-
partism. Not all multi-party systems, i.e. systems with more than two political parties in the 
parliament often-forming multiparty coalition governments, automatically have a weak master-
issue dimension. The presence in parliament of niche parties competing on a secondary socio-
cultural dimension – for instance, an ethnic or Green party with a small and stable constituency – 
does not necessarily mean there will be a weak economic master dimension, as those parties might 
not affect the dynamics of the mainstream party competition, which may be single-dimensional. 
Similarly, two-party systems can lack single-dimension equilibrium when secondary issues are 
successfully made more salient by certain actors, who in these systems are more likely to be party 
activists than niche parties (Miller and Schofield 2003).  
This has consequences when we are trying to explain what aspects of party politics affect 
protest. Other studies also expect a substitutive relationship between protest and party politics and 
suggest that ‘the institutionalization of a cleavage …  implies that the competition is no longer 
taking place in unconventional terms’ (Kriesi et al. 1995, 6; also Koopmans et al. 2005, 187; 
Giugni et al. 2005). However, those studies do not distinguish between the master and secondary 
status of the dimensions of political conflict and expect that this substitutive effect will be 
generated by all the issues articulated in the party arena or by the very presence of different parties 
in parliament, regardless of what their master or secondary/niche position is. For instance, this 
theory would imply that a niche Green party in parliament (that competes on the secondary issue 
dimension in most party systems) would have the effect of reducing environmental protest the 
same way a social-democratic party (that in most party systems competes on the master issue 
dimension) would decrease economic protest.  
In contrast, our theory emphasises the crucial importance of 1) the hierarchy of salience 
among issue dimensions, with the master-issue dimension being the primary factor constraining 
the actions of both niche parties and protest competing on secondary issues, and of 2) the strength 
of this issue hierarchy, i.e. the degree to which mainstream parties and the party system converge 




party politics or the presence of specific political actors in parliament, irrespective of the 
importance of the issues that mainstream parties compete on, would blur this distinction.  
As a caveat, our theory cannot predict the specific nature of the issues contested in party 
and protest politics in individual countries. That depends on exogenous factors, such as the social 
structure, historical legacies, political and international events, the design of political institutions 
etc. (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Our theory only deals with the mechanism 
of how different issue agendas contested in party and protest arenas are related.  
 
Design  
Since almost all party systems in Western democracies have economic master-issue dimension 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Benoit and Laver 2006; Rovny and Edwards 2012), we focus on four 
East-Central European democracies – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – that 
show variation in the content and strength of their master-issue dimension. In the analysis below 
we will present data on the dimensional structure of the four countries’ party politics; here we 
discuss the logic of the design.  
Because our theory applies to systems with consolidated democratic representation, our 
analysis of the four countries begins in 1993. The structure of political competition in the post-
revolution period of 1989-1993 was in all four countries still influenced by the conflict between 
the old and new regimes and democratic contestation was still in the process of formation at that 
time (Enyedi 2005; Enyedi 2006; Mansfeldová 2013, 221–22). The data collection ends in 2010, 
which is often interpreted as a turning point for the party systems of some of the studied countries 
(Dawson and Hanley 2016).  
Table 1 presents a summary of the research design and predictions. We split the sample 
into different country-periods based on the strength and the content of the master-issue dimension 
in the country’s party politics. The first two columns of Table 1 show that the sample displays 
cross-country and within-country variation in terms of the strength (from strong uni-
dimensionality to disequilibrium) and the content of their master-issue dimension (economic or 
socio-cultural). The content of the master dimension is economic in two countries (Czech Republic 
and Slovakia after 2001) and socio-cultural in two countries (Hungary and Poland). The variation 
in the strength of the master-issue dimension cross-cuts differences in content: there is strong 




in Poland before 2002; there is a weak single-dimensional tendency in Slovakia after 2001 and in 
Poland after 2001; and there is disequilibrium in Slovakia between 1993 and 2001 and in Hungary 
after 2006. The third column shows the expected character of the national protest agenda.  
 
– Table 1 – 
 
The sample also makes it possible to disentangle alternative explanations. Firstly, the differences 
in the national protest agenda across the four countries cannot be explained by the 
institutionalisation of an issue dimension in party politics, as most social movement literature 
would suggest, regardless of whether it was a master dimension or not. All four countries have 
multi-party systems with niche political parties and thus both issue dimensions are represented in 
their parliaments. Secondly, the design controls for the institutionalisation of specific party 
organisations, as the long-term stability of the issue dynamics of party competition, which is 
present especially in the Czech Republic and Hungary, is combined with a relatively high 
fluctuation in terms of specific party organisations (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009; Rovny 
2015; Rovny and Polk 2017).  
 
Data and measurement  
The national protest agenda  
We use data from protest event analysis (PEA), which is based on a content analysis of public 
records (e.g. newspaper articles) and makes it possible to capture aggregate levels of protest across 
space and over time and especially the protest’s issue agenda. The data come from the electronic 
archives of the national news agencies: the Czech News Agency, the News Agency of the Slovak 
Republic, the MTI Hungarian News Agency Corporation, and the Polish Press Agency. The 
archives of these news agencies provide a very good picture of overall protest in the four countries. 
One reason is that the incidence of protest in the four countries is very low2 and the countries are 
rather small (except for Poland). This means that protest is a special and remarkable event that 
                                                          
2 The four countries have some of the lowest levels of public participation in demonstrations among contemporary 
democracies, as no more than 5% of their populations participate yearly in demonstrations. Also, on most days there 
are no protest events (there were no protest events on 66% of days in the Czech Republic, 79% of days in Slovakia, 
46% of days in Poland and 25% of days in Hungary between 1993 and 2010) and on the majority of protest days there 
were only a few events (there were three or fewer protest events on 77% of protest days in the Czech Republic, 79% 




attracts a great deal of media attention even at the national level. All four news agencies also have 
regional offices. As well, unlike print newspapers, the news agencies do not have a limit to the 
number of news items that can be covered in each day and thus they do not suffer from the selection 
bias in their coverage of events that occurs when multiple items have to compete for limited space 
in a news medium. The archives are moreover the single most important source of event data, more 
so than newspapers, because there is no explicit political bias in the agencies in favour of or against 
a particular type of event or actor. As we are primarily comparing the relative composition of 
national protest agendas and not the absolute numbers of protest events across the four countries, 
there is also less potential for bias resulting from the differences in the event coverage of the four 
news agencies.  
A collective political event is defined as an actual gathering of at least three people who 
convene in a public space to assert claims that have a bearing on the interests of an 
institution/collective actor. A list of 22 keywords referring to collective political events was used 
to search all the news reported in the electronic archives. The whole period was covered without 
any sampling of years or days. All news items that matched our definition of protest, described 
above, were manually selected from the sample produced by the keyword search and relevant 
variables were manually coded for each event by eight coders.3  
We use empirical findings from other studies on the dimensionality of political competition 
(Hutter 2014; Kriesi et al. 2008; Rovny and Edwards 2012) to classify the specific ‘topic/policy 
areas’ of each protest event under the economic and the socio-cultural dimension. Since the 
‘topics/policy’ areas of some protest events are less clear-cut, such as industry- and infrastructure-
related projects, where the construction of a building can be protested for economic reasons or also 
for environmental reasons, we add ‘framing’ as a second coding variable indicating whether the 
framing of the protest event was economic or socio-cultural. As a result, protest focusing on 
economic issues encompasses events concerned with economic policies (e.g. monetary issues, 
taxes) or social policies (welfare state issues) and/or use an economic framing (the main argument 
is, for instance, ‘economic efficiency and economic needs’ or ‘socio-economic rights’). Protest 
events concerned with socio-cultural issues focus on socio-cultural topics/policy areas, such as 
immigration, rights or environment, and/or use a socio-cultural framing, such as arguments 
                                                          
3 All the coders spoke Czech in addition to the language of the country they coded. The Czech data were used for 




referring to ‘authority and tradition’ or the ‘benefits of cultural diversity’. ‘Other’ was used as the 
category for events that do not meet any of the criteria outlined above to categorise the event as 
concerned with either an economic or a socio-cultural issue.4 The specific coding scheme is 
presented in the Appendix.  
 
The content and strength of the master-issue dimension  
To measure the dimensional structure of the national party agenda we use qualitative data on 
political cleavages (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Berglund et al. 2013; Bértoa 2014; Whitefield 2002) and 
standardised data on issue saliency from expert surveys: the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey  
(CHES) (Bakker et al. 2015) and the 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey (Benoit and Laver 2006). 
Both surveys asked the national experts to assess the importance/salience of various issues for each 
party on a scale from 1 to 10 or to 20 (see the Appendix). We weighted the salience each party 
attached to each of the issues covered in the surveys by the party’s vote share to identify the 
system-level hierarchy of the salience of the individual issues contested in party politics. By using 
the same coding as that for protest events to distinguish between the economic and the socio-
cultural issue dimensions, we identified the content of the master-issue dimension, i.e. whether the 
most important line of political conflict is economic or socio-cultural. To capture the strength of 
the specific master-issue dimension (i.e. whether the conflict between mainstream political parties 
is one-dimensional or whether the single-dimension equilibrium is weak/non-existent), we contrast 
the system-level salience of economic issues with that of socio-cultural issues. Specifically, we 
calculated the difference between the salience of the economic dimension and the most salient 
issue among the socio-cultural issues. A plus/minus sign attached to this measure indicates which 
of the issue dimensions is the more salient one (i.e. party systems with an economic master 
dimension have a plus sign, party systems with a socio-cultural master-issue dimension have a 
minus sign) and the number indicates the strength of this master-issue dimension (a greater number 
means a bigger difference in the salience of the two issue dimensions, i.e. stronger single-
dimensionality).  
 
                                                          
4 The episodes of protest in Slovakia related to the semi-democratic regime of V. Mečiar (1992-1998) that were 
organised by mainstream political actors (main parties, president, MPs etc.) are also included in the ‘other’ category 





Figure 1 presents the yearly sum of protest events by issues in the four countries from 1993 to 
2010. Specifically, the first column shows economic protest events, the second column shows 
socio-cultural protest events, and the third column shows the ‘other’ category. As we are interested 
in issue dimensions that are salient in the national protest agenda, the primary interpretation of 
Figure 1 lies in the comparison between the share of economic and socio-cultural protest in a given 
country-period. Table 2 displays the relation of the national protest agendas to the issue structure 
of party politics. The second column of Table 2 presents the differences in the proportion of 
economic and socio-cultural protest across the country-periods. The third and the fourth column 
summarise the strength of the master dimension and its content. The fifth row presents the 
standardised measures of the content and strength of the master-issue dimension calculated on data 
from the two expert surveys (CHES 2006 and Benoit and Laver 2003), provided the data are 
available for a given period.  
 
– Figure 1 – 
 
– Table 2 – 
 
In the Czech Republic, the composition of national protest agenda has been predominantly socio-
cultural (mostly human rights, foreign policy, and environment) throughout the studied period 
(Figure 1). The number of socio-cultural protest events is almost in every year double than the 
number of protest events relating to economic issues. As Table 2 shows, there were 43% more 
socio-cultural protest events than economic protest events. Supporting our theory, the long-term 
predominance of socio-cultural dimension in the protest arena is consistent with the content and 
strength of the master-issue dimension of Czech party politics, as the economic dimension was a 
strong master-issue dimension in the Czech party politics throughout the period studied 
(Mansfeldová 2013, 221; Kopecký 2007, 120). The issues of economic transformation dominated 
the 1990s, and economic issues such as taxes, health care, and pensions have structured party 
politics ever since (Linek and Lacina 2010). Since 1996 the economic dimension was the focal 
issue dimension of the two largest political parties: the Czech Social Democratic Party, which was 




was the dominant party on the right. In this respect, out of our four cases the Czech Republic is 
closest to Western democracies, where there is typically a strong economic dimension in party 
politics and where the protest arena mainly revolves around socio-cultural issues (Hutter 2014, 
142). The standardised data from the expert surveys (1.0/0.27) shown in Table 2 confirm the 
strength of the economic dimension in party politics as well. The positive value of the difference 
indicates that economic issues are the most salient issue dimension in the party competition; that 
this measure is higher in the CR means that this master dimension is more dominant compared to 
the socio-cultural dimension in the CR than it is in Slovakia and Poland, which have values closer 
to zero.  
 Importantly, the strongly one-dimensional nature of Czech party politics centred mainly on 
economic issues has not been weakened by the presence of niche parties in parliament seeking to 
compete on socio-cultural issues. These included nationalistic parties fighting for the cultural and 
territorial autonomy of the eastern part of the country (the Self-governing Democracy Movement 
– Association for Moravia and Silesia, in parliament between 1990 and 1996); a far right nationalist 
and xenophobic party (the Association of the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, in 
parliament in 1992-1998); and the Green Party (2006-2010). These parties were relatively small 
and did not destabilise the strongly one-dimensional nature of party competition over economic 
issues in Czech party politics. The simultaneous existence of relatively strong single-dimension 
party competition and the occasional presence of niche parties in parliament competing on the 
secondary-issue dimension provides important support for our theory. As we can see, the mutually 
exclusive relationship between the party and protest agendas is determined by the content and the 
strength of the master-issue dimension. It is not just a matter of the degree to which different issue 
dimensions are institutionalised in party politics, regardless of whether they form the primary 
(mainstream parties) or the secondary dimension (niche parties and protest).  
 Like the Czech Republic, Hungary shows the predominant presence of one issue dimension 
in its protest arena that is relatively stable until 2006. Thematically, protest is different from that 
in the Czech Republic. As Figure 1 shows, the vast majority of protest organised in Hungary 
addressed economic issues like taxes and wages. Table 2 reports that there were many more 
economic protest events (by 45% in the 1993-2006) than there were events focusing on socio-
cultural issues. Consistent with our theory, the predominantly economic protest agenda is 




politics between 1993 and 2006. Since 1994, ‘non-economic issues defined party positions, inter-
party distances and electoral behaviour... [and] economic policy issues and social class played a 
minor role in party competition’ (Tóka and Popa 2013, 318). Specifically, the original economic 
master dimension that dominated Hungarian party competition in the first post-revolutionary years 
switched to a strong socio-cultural dimension after 1993 (Enyedi 2005). From 1994 several socio-
cultural issues became more prominent and came to form the basis of the one-dimensional 
structure that divided Hungarian party politics between two poles: the socially conservative, 
Christian-national, anti-communist and agrarian position on one side, and the secular, 
cosmopolitan, and urban one on the other (Rovny and Edwards 2012; Tóka and Popa 2013). After 
1993 FIDESZ gradually consolidated its ‘reign over the [socially conservative] right’ (Enyedi 
2006, 233) and became the main force of opposition to the secular and cosmopolitan socialists 
(MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party). In terms of institutionalisation, these two parties became the 
organisational hegemons on each side. In the elections between 1998 and 2010 (four elections) the 
two parties gained between 60 and 85% of the total vote. The relatively strong dominance of the 
socio-cultural dimension in party politics is also confirmed by the results from the expert surveys 
(-0.8/-0.18) accompanied by a negative sign (i.e. the socio-cultural content of the master 
dimension) and a greater value (i.e. the large gap in the strength of salience between the socio-
cultural master dimension and the secondary economic issue dimension).    
 The one-dimensional equilibrium of Hungarian party politics was destabilised after the fall 
2006 leak of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s (MSZP) secret party meeting speech earlier that 
year that led to the ensuing collapse of the socialists.  With the collapse of one pole of the main 
dimension in Hungarian party politics, the one-dimensional equilibrium posited on the socio-
cultural dimension that had produced the eliminatory effect on the secondary economic dimension 
was disrupted. This opened up the mainstream space of competition to various issues and various 
actors and led to the greater convergence of issues contested in party and protest politics. Firstly, 
the party and protest politics aligned around massive anti-government protests (Kriesi 2014, 359–
60), which are indicated by the large number of protest events related to democratic institutions 
and the state included in the category ‘other’ (‘institutions’ in Figure 1), and that contributed to 
the 2010 landslide electoral victory of FIDESZ. Secondly, after 2006 there was a decline in 
economic protest and a slight increase in socio-cultural protest, most of it produced by the 




the disequilibrium in party politics, which lacks the previously strong hierarchy among contested 
issue dimensions (the socio-cultural master dimension and economic issues dismissed to a niche 
secondary position), goes together with a lacking hierarchy in protest issues. In this period socio-
cultural and economic issues are evenly present in the protest agenda (with only 1% more socio-
cultural issues).  
 In Poland, the national protest agenda was in the first decade predominantly economic, 
focusing mostly on economic issues such as taxes and wages. Almost every year the number of 
economic events is almost double the number of socio-cultural protest events. Between 1993 and 
2001, economic protest account for 55% of events, and only 24% were socio-cultural (difference 
= 31% in Table 2). In line with our theory, this corresponds to the relatively strong socio-cultural 
master dimension that structured Polish party competition in this period (Stanley 2013). Until 
2001, religion and the communist past were more salient in Polish party politics than the economy. 
Polish party conflict focused on diverging interpretations of basic religious and civilisational 
values that reflected a conflict between secular and confessional views and contrasting 
perspectives on the Polish communist past. This affected what ‘left’ and ‘right’ stand for in party 
politics. Unlike in Western Europe and the Czech Republic, where left and right align with 
different models of political economy, ‘in the language of Polish politics this ideological cleavage, 
not the socio-economic one, is defined as the left-right dimension’ (Jasiewicz 2007, 88). 
Throughout the 1990s the one-dimensional socio-cultural party competition was dominated by the 
post-communist Democratic Left Alliance on the left and there were a number of anti-communist 
parties on the right.  
Around the start of the new millennium the agenda of party politics changed. The economic 
issues, most notably post-communist economic transformation strategy and privatisation became 
more relevant than before. It was the 2001 elections that put what at that time were understood to 
be conservative radicals (the agrarian-populist Self-Defence Party and the catholic-nationalist 
League of Polish Families) at the centre of attention (Stanley 2013, 180). New issues, such as 
privatisation, emerged that weakened the socio-cultural dimension and led to cross-cutting party 
contestation on both issue dimensions (Bértoa 2014, 26). As a result, the Polish party system 
became more bi-dimensional, with parties competing on socio-cultural issues intersected by 
economic issues. The values 0.05 and -0.08 in Table 2 for the indicators on party politics’ issue 




between the salience of the economic dimension and the socio-cultural dimension in party politics 
is small and that both dimensions are salient. The negative sign next to the greater figure indicates 
that the socio-cultural dimension is still the more important dimension.  
The bi-dimensional character of Polish party competition is best symbolised by the Law 
and Justice Party (PiS) established in 2001. For the PiS, the left and the liberals of the first 
transition period represented not just a different model of socio-economic development, but also a 
serious civilisational threat to the very existence of the Polish nation and its core values. This is a 
reflection of the character of party competition in the second decade under study, when it revolved 
around both cultural and economic issues. Accordingly, in its programme PiS successfully merged 
the defence of Polish culture (issues of cultural nationalism) with the defence of the economically 
vulnerable parts of the population living outside metropolitan areas (issues of economic equality). 
The position of the PiS is not, however, offset by a single opposing position that could serve as a 
gravitational pole for cultural and economic liberalism, and instead there are two opposing 
positions: one represents the intersection of economic liberalism and cultural conservatism and the 
other the intersection of economic and cultural liberalism.  
This shift in party politics affected Polish protest in the second decade, as we can see in 
Figure 1 and Table 2. When the exclusion effect of the one-dimensional equilibrium posited on 
socio-cultural issues observed in the first decade grew weaker, the protest agenda became more 
like the issues contested in party politics. Specifically, there was a minor decline in economic 
protest and an increase in socio-cultural issues, and particularly an increase in protests focused on 
foreign polity and international politics. Nevertheless, protest is still slightly more centred on 
economic issues (by 7 %, Table 2), which corresponds to the slightly greater importance of socio-
cultural issues in party politics.  
 Unlike in the other three countries, the protest agenda in Slovakia has not been 
characterised by the predominance of one issue dimension for most of the studied period. As Figure 
1 shows, both economic and socio-cultural protest have been salient in Slovak protest politics. In 
the first decade there was slightly more economic protest (4% more economic than socio-cultural, 
Table 2) and a significant amount of protest fell into the ‘other’ category. This is in line with our 
theory. The first decade of Slovak party politics was not characterised by the presence of a strong 
economic master dimension like in the Czech Republic; on the contrary, the more important socio-




relevant economic issues (Bértoa 2014, 26). At the same time, as we can see in Figure 1, a large 
share of protest fell into the ‘other’ category between 1993 and 2001, the category in which we 
included protests relating to the post/semi-authoritarian period of Slovak politics under Prime 
Minister Mečiar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS, in power 1992-1998). 
These democracy-related protests account for 21% of all protest events in the period between 1993 
and 2001 and were organised by both HZDS (which kept organising protests even after the 1998 
elections, when, even though it had won the elections, it was ousted from government because it 
had lost its coalition partner) and its opponents (civil society actors, the Party of the Democratic 
Left, the Christian Democratic Movement, and even the President). The reason is that during this 
period we do not see the standard logic of democratic politics at work, where the tendency should 
be for mainstream parties to compete on the most important issue dimension (either economic or 
socio-cultural) while niche parties and protest politics contest the secondary issues. Instead the 
political system showed short-term disequilibrium with political conflict revolving around the very 
character of the political regime, with all the democratic forces aligning against HZDS, which 
resulted in the convergence of party and protest politics above and beyond economic or socio-
cultural issues.   
Economic issues did not establish themselves as the stronger dimension of party politics 
until the beginning of the second post-communist decade, after Prime Minister Mečiar’s semi-
authoritarian government ended. After 2000, the party conflict settled mainly around economic 
issues, ‘without abandoning the nationalist appeals altogether’ (Deegan-Krause 2013, 276). In 
other words, around 2000 Slovakia experienced a shift in the content of its master dimension, 
which became more economic, though it retained a symbolic nationalist overtone (ibid: 272-273). 
The data from the expert surveys (0 and 0.02 in Table 2) show that there is no or only a small 
difference in the salience of the two dimensions, with slightly greater importance given to 
economic issues. In line with our theory, in the 2002-2007 period we find a balance between 
economic and socio-cultural protest. The decline in economic protest and the growth of socio-
cultural protest during the period between 2002 and 2005 led to the predominance of socio-cultural 
issues in Slovak protest politics (Figure 1). In this period, the dimensional structure of Slovak party 
politics and its national protest agenda became more like the structure of protest and party issues 
in the Czech Republic, with economic issues being a single dimension of focus of party politics 






Social movement literature has traditionally recognised the exclusive insider–outsider pattern 
between party-electoral and protest-advocacy arenas (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 11; Tilly 
1978). However, it has never been entirely clear what exactly distinguishes the two arenas as being 
in opposition to each other. Obviously, the difference does not lie in the type of actors and 
strategies used – political parties running in elections versus social movements protesting – as 
parties and movements get involved in both types of strategies (Goldstone 2003, 7; Kriesi et al. 
1995, 152ff). 
Drawing on the issue dimensionality and niche party literature, our theory suggests that the 
main line of demarcation lies in the hierarchy of issue dimensions that the actors compete on 
(master or secondary importance) and the resulting mechanism of representation through office- 
or policy-seeking. Specifically, the issue dimensions contested in the two political arenas have a 
substitutive effect in relation to each other that results from the fact that the office-seeking 
competition that dominates the electoral arena works to establish a one-dimensional equilibrium. 
These dynamics tend to reduce political conflict to just one main political divide at the centre of 
the mainstream parties’ competition, squeeze out the other issue dimension, and relegate the 
competition over this niche dimension to the arena of policy-seeking strategies, with protest being 
a prominent type of such strategy.  
When the uni-dimensional equilibrium in party politics is weaker or does not exist, the 
composition of the protest agendas is generally more balanced and the gap between economic and 
socio-cultural protest is much smaller. The reason is that the eliminatory effect of the master 
dimension is weaker because the single-dimension equilibrium of the whole party system is 
disrupted by a salient secondary issue dimension that mainstream parties compete on as well, in 
which case they do not try to push this dimension out of party politics. As a result, we see greater 
congruence between the issues that are contested in party and protest politics in these countries. 
We were able to empirically support this theory on the sample of four East-Central European 
countries that have a unique combination of characteristics to allow an empirical investigation. In 
contrast to most Western democracies, three of the four studied countries have had in at least one 




2001) and the country-periods varied in the strength of the master dimension (from strong uni-
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Party Master Dimension 
Country-Period 
Prediction: 
Protest agenda Strength  Content 
Strong one-dimensionality Economic Czech Rep., 1993-2010 
Predominantly 
socio-cultural  
Strong one-dimensionality Socio-cultural Hungary, 1993-2006 
Predominantly 
economic   
One-dimensionality Socio-cultural  Poland, 1993-2001 
Dominantly 
economic 
Weak one-dimensionality Socio-cultural crosscut by economic Poland, 2002-2010 
Convergence: 
economic 
Weak one-dimensionality Economic crosscut by socio-cultural Slovakia, 2002-2010 
Convergence: 
socio-cultural 
Disequilibrium Post/Semi-authoritarian regime Slovakia, 1993-2001 Convergence 











Note: Yearly absolute number of protest events by issue and country. The solid lines display smoothed trends (moving 
average, window 2 1 2). Economic dimension (from top): economy, social policy, other events with economic framing; 
Socio-cultural dimension (from top): Rights, foreign policy, environment, other events with socio-cultural framing; 
Other (from top): Mečiar (only Slovakia, events related to Mečiar’s semi-authoritarian regime organised by political 
parties and politicians), institutions, industry and urban planning, other events. Vertical reference lines signify the 











Party agenda  
Country-period 
 (% economic – 
% socio-cultural 
dimension) 
Strength of the master 
dimension 






Czech Republic, 1993-2010 -43 Strong one-dimensionality Economic 1.0/0.27 
Hungary, 1993-2006 45 Strong one-dimensionality Socio-cultural -0.8/-0.18 
Poland, 1993-2001 31 One-dimensionality Socio-cultural  - 




Slovakia, 2002-2010 -11 Weak one-dimensionality 
Economic crosscut by 
cultural 
0/0.02 




Hungary, 2007-2010 -1 Disequilibrium 
Collapse of one pole of 
the master dimension   
- 
 
Note: Data on the national protest agenda come from the PEA V4, qualitative data on the content and dominance of 
the master dimension come from Berglund et al. (2013), Webb and White (2007), and Bértoa (2014), and 
quantitative data on party politics dimensionality are calculated from expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2003/CHES 
2006).  
 
 
